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Abstract 
In December 2006, the Australian Parliament liberalized regulation governing stem cell 
research. This decision and preceding legislative review generated considerable public debate, 
which centred on objections to the deliberate creation and destruction of human embryos for 
research purposes. This paper draws on qualitative research conducted on the public debate 
surrounding this policy episode. The aim of this research was to examine how science and 
scientific knowledge is mobilized by participants in these debates to support their arguments. 
Data was collected from 109 newspaper opinion editorials as well as 23 in-depth interviews and 
examined using qualitative content and thematic analysis. Results of this analysis depict science 
as a rhetorical, moral and political resource that provides opportunities for participants to gain 
legitimacy, negotiate meaning and assert authority in the public domain. The mobilization of 
science in public discourse is discussed along with suggestions that are aimed at encouraging 
greater transparency and inclusiveness in public debates around contested science and 
emergent technologies. 
Lysaght & Kerridge (2012) Public Understanding of Science. 21(2): 195-210. Post-review copy. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since embryonic stem cell (ESC) lines were first isolated from human blastocysts in 1998, 
following the first cloned mammal using somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) a year earlier, the 
public debate around stem cell research has typically centred on the moral status of human 
embryos and the utility of stem cells. Opponents of stem cell research have generally argued 
that it is morally unconscionable to destroy human embryos for research while its advocates 
argue that the potential for substantial medical and therapeutic benefits outweighs such 
concerns. In response to this debate, many industrialized countries have enacted legislation to 
regulate the practices and techniques involved in stem cell research.  
International reviews of regulation around this research suggest that while there is 
considerable variation in the permissibility of ESC research and SCNT (Gottweis, 2002; Jasanoff, 
2005; Waldby & Salter, 2008; Walters, 2004), a high degree of cross-cultural uniformity exists in 
what is considered to be in need of regulation (Hauskeller, 2005). Generally speaking, 
regulatory regimes take into account both the welfare of human embryos and the duty to care 
for the sick and vulnerable (Banchoff, 2005; Gottweis, 2002). Whereas oversight of research 
with somatic or ‘adult’ stem cells (ASC) tends to fall within existing mechanisms that regulate 
research with human tissues and clinical trials (Wilson-Kovacs, Weber, & Hauskeller, 2009). This 
paper focuses on the public debates surrounding the regulation of ESC research and SCNT in 
Australia.  
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Policy Responses to Stem Cell Research in Australia 
Australia has taken a relatively liberal regulatory approach. In response to the reported 
successes in human ESC isolation and cloning experiments, the Australian Commonwealth and 
state governments sought to develop a nationally consistent legislative framework (Nicol, 
Chalmers, & Gogarty, 2002). After protracted public and parliamentary debate in 2001-2, the 
Australian Federal Parliament enacted the Research Involving Human Embryos Act (2002b) and 
the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act (2002a). This legislation prohibited the use of SCNT for 
any purpose and only allowed research on surplus IVF embryos created prior to April 2002 
(Nicol, et al., 2002). A three-year review was built into the legislation to consider the scope and 
operation of both Acts and to make recommendations for amendments (Legislation Review 
Committee, 2005a).  
The LRC submitted its report in December 2005 making fifty six (56) recommendations 
(Legislation Review Committee, 2005b). The LRC advised maintaining the prohibition of SCNT 
for research purposes but recommended that the creation of SCNT embryos for research 
purposes be permitted (Cooper, 2006). All but onei of the LRC’s recommendations were 
accepted by the Federal Government (Ankeny & Dodds, 2008; Harvey, 2008). In December 
2006, the Federal Parliament enacted the Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and 
the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Act (2006). These acts went into effect 
in June 2007 and most states have since enacted complimentary legislation to reflect the 
amendments. The legislative scheme will be reviewed again in 2010. 
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In the public debate surrounding these episodes, science is contested in talk surrounding the 
nature of human embryos and stem cells. These contests are also reflected in discourses that 
emphasize the need to care for the sick against those seeking to protect early-stage human life. 
The distinction between the two sets of discourses – the axiological talk about morals and 
values and the science talk about technical feasibility and utility – is often blurred and difficult 
to determine. Participants slip effortlessly between the two discourses because science, which 
is often presented in public debate as being value-neutral (Mooney, 2001), is laden with values 
(Proctor, 1991). Science thus provides a range of discursive resources that participants may 
draw upon in stating their values and positioning themselves effectively within a debate. 
Examination of these resources can thus provide important insights into how science is 
constructed and mobilized in public discourse. This paper, therefore, presents the results of 
empirical research that examined how science was mobilized in the claims participants used 
throughout the 2005-6 Australian stem cell policy episode to support their preferences.  
2. Methods 
This study used qualitative methods to thematically analyze the descriptive and normative 
content of the ‘science claims’ used by participants during the 2005-6 stem cell policy episode 
in Australia. Evidence was sourced from 109 opinion editorial texts published in Australian 
newspapers and 23 semi-structured interviews with participants from the public debate. This 
data was examined using analytical categories constructed from themes identified in the extant 
philosophical, sociological and critical literatures relating to the fact-value distinction, the 
authority of science, legitimation and the use of rhetoric in policy contexts. Methods and 
justifications used in this study are detailed elsewhereii. 
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Briefly, opinion editorials (or ‘op-eds’) were collected electronically from two nationally 
distributed and twelve major metropolitan newspapers using the Factiva database. Op-ed texts 
were analyzed using NVivo software for the presence of science claims and examined according 
to the contributor’s declared policy positioniii. Science claims were analyzed for descriptive and 
normative content relating to the nature and status of stem cells and/or human embryos and 
tissues using a focused discourse approach similar to Mulkay’s (1997) analysis of embryo 
research debates in the UK. Interviewees were selected using purposive sampling techniques 
(Merriam, 1988) drawing both from the op-ed contributors and from those who provided public 
submissions and/or presentations during the legislative review process. All interviews were 
recorded using a digital recorder and transcribed into Microsoft Word for analysis. Both 
datasets were analyzed using thematic categories constructed from the extant literature and 
refined using iterative processes that allowed others to emerge from the data. Results of the 
op-eds and interviews are discussed separatelyiv with respect to the relevant literature under 
the two headings that follow and summarized in the conclusions. 
3. Science as a Moral Discourse 
Of the fifty-six participants identified as op-ed contributors, twenty-six were categorized as 
policy advocates and twenty-five as policy opponents. The position of five was unclearv. Of the 
twenty-three interviewees, fourteen advocated the policy proposal while nine were opposed. 
Participants supporting either position drew on a relatively diverse, yet limited pool of science 
claims, which were categorized as having either implied a value proposition about the moral 
status of embryos (or human tissues) and/or the potential benefits of stem cell research. These 
claims were associated with the participants’ policy position. 
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Thirty-nine of the fifty-six op-ed contributors were found to have made a claim about moral 
status. Twenty-two policy opponents made claims that implied that human embryos have 
relevant moral status while none were found to have made claims that implied otherwise. 
Eleven also made other claims that implied human tissues have no such moral status. In 
contrast, no policy advocates claimed that embryos have relevant moral status. Indeed, 
seventeen made claims that implied that embryos lacked the moral status that would protect 
them from use in research. Only two advocates implied that human tissues also lack moral 
status suggesting that the comparable moral significance of embryonic and non-embryonic 
sources of stem cells had greater relevance to the opponents’ position. The total number of 
advocates making these types of claims was eighteen. 
Similar associations were found in the claims made about the medical utility of stem cells. A 
total of forty-four op-ed contributors used these types of claims. All twenty-six policy advocates 
used a claim that implied that ESCs and/or SCNT have potential medical utility. Four also made 
claims that suggested that ASCs have potential utility. Three advocates suggested that ASCs do 
not have the potential of ESCs. On the other hand, thirteen opponents of the policy proposal 
claimed that ASCs have proven medical utility and also have greater potential for future 
applications than ESCs. Eighteen opponents used other claims that denied the potential utility 
of ESC/SCNT research.  
Many different aspects of stem cells were drawn upon in support of the different utility claims. 
Emphasis of these aspects throughout the op-eds was, however, contingent upon the 
contributors’ position and was often interrelated with other claims made about moral status. 
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Policy advocates tended to emphasize the pluripotency and specificity of ESCs whereas the 
opponents tended to draw more on the genetic, immunogenic and tumourgenetic properties of 
ESCs while also highlighting the specificity of ASCs. In all cases, these claims were invested with 
norms and values that reflected the participants’ support of a particular position. 
For example, claims about stem cell potency were laden with values that direct scientific 
research towards medical applications, rather than (just) epistemic science. Such claims implied 
that the real value of science is understood to lie not merely in the knowledge it generates but 
in its practical utility. When policy advocates used these claims, the concept of pluripotency 
was framed as a moral good, which manifest in the seriousness of the conditions that advocates 
claimed ESCs could treat. Throughout their op-eds, policy advocates such as Leslie Cannold 
from the University of Melbourne described these conditions as “untreatable” and “incurable”. 
In doing so, the concept of pluripotency was invested with meaning that implied that cells with 
these properties are highly valuable. 
The aim of embryonic stem-cell research is to gain knowledge about pluripotent cells, those 
capable of becoming any tissue in the body. Scientists are hopeful that such cells will help us 
develop treatments for incurable conditions such as motor neurone disease, Alzheimer's and the 
sorts of spinal cord injuries suffered by the late actor Christopher Reeve. [Leslie Cannold] The 
Adelaide Advertiser 
On the other hand, claims about pluripotency appeared quite differently when used by policy 
opponents, who did not deny that ESCs were pluripotent, but instead, drew on other 
characteristics such as teratoma formation and host-against-graft immune responses to 
devalue the practical utility of these cells. As suggested by Michael Cassonova from the 
Australian Family Association in his op-ed, pluripotent cells are powerful, but ultimately 
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undesirable for treating patients. From this claim, he argued that ESCs have no such value as to 
justify more permissive laws: 
Embryo stem cells are very potent, but also very unstable: they have a tendency to form 
teratomas, tumour-like masses that can include teeth, skin, hair and bone. That is not good for 
mouse brains or rats' knee joints. Beyond that, embryo stem cells have a tendency to accumulate 
mutations. And the problem of patients' bodies rejecting embryo stem cells is bigger than 
expected. [Michael Cassonova] The Age (Melbourne) 
In response to the question over the permissibility of SCNT, policy advocates used these 
characteristics to argue for its necessity. Advocates argued that SNCT offered the possibility to 
create patient-specific cell lines that could, at least theoretically, circumvent known problems 
of transplanting ESCs into immunologically incompatible tissues. This type of claim was denied 
by policy opponents who argued that other alternatives exist by drawing attention to the 
demonstrated clinical utility of ASCs and ongoing research in different contexts. David van Gend 
from the Do No Harm campaign drew on evidence submitted to the LRC by Professor Alan 
Mackay-Sim to cast doubt on the purported value and necessity of ESCs and SCNT as “useless”, 
“dangerous”, “redundant and impractical”: 
There are now 65 human diseases treated with adult stem cells, while embryo stem cells remain 
both useless and dangerous and, as even the Lockhart committee concedes, have not a single 
human application. If these safe and ethically uncomplicated adult stem cells from the back of 
your nose are as good as these scientists say, the whole case for cloning has been rendered, as 
Mackay-Sim told the Lockhart committee, "redundant and impractical". [David van Gend] The 
Courier Mail (Brisbane). 
Talk about science in this context was thus a moral discourse. Any discussion of utility is 
explicitly moral because of judgments that are made about beneficence as a normative good 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). As other scholars have noted, science is generally valued within 
modern societies for its practical usefulness, which often serves as a powerful moral argument 
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in science policymaking (Resnik, 1998), particularly when the potential health and medical 
benefits are significant and the supposed necessity of the research is pertinent (Callahan, 
2003). These arguments are, in turn, countered with others that either dispute the potential for 
benefits and/or argue that the moral, social and/or economic costs are too high to justify the 
research. 
The major issue that was associated with stem cell research in Australian debate was the 
creation and destruction of early human life. Arguments relating to these issues manifest in the 
claims participants used to describe the morphological, biological and genetic attributes of 
human and non-human animals and the moral significance that is attached to these features. 
These descriptions contained normative assumptions about the significance of certain 
biological characteristics as determinants of moral status. While these moral arguments were 
sometimes made explicit, they were more often implicit in how participants spoke about and 
described human embryos. 
Discursive Portrayals of the Embryo 
Rhetoric was frequently employed in statements made about the biological and technical 
aspects of stem cell research, which included descriptions of the embryos’ size, shape and 
genomic composition as well as the processes in which they are created and destroyed. 
Unsurprisingly, the rhetoric employed by policy advocates implied different meanings and 
claims about the moral significance of these attributes than that of the opponents. For 
example, human embryos were attributed with little to no moral status in statements made by 
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policy advocates such as Bob Turner and Joanne Knott who drew on aspects of foetal 
developmental to describe the embryo as a “tiny cluster of cells”:  
It is this tiny cluster of cells, so small they can barely be seen under a microscope, and unfertilized 
by sperm, that opponents of SCNT focus on. Opponents of SCNT claim that this cluster of cells is a 
human being: we say it is human cellular material, and because this will never be implanted in a 
uterus, it can never develop into a human being. [Bob Turner and Joanne Knott] The Australian 
Turner and Knott’s language devalued embryos as microscopic “cellular material” and 
contained unstated assumptions about the moral significance of intent. Very different 
assumptions underpinned the manner in which opponents of ESC research rejected the idea 
that the size and shape of embryos were morally relevant attributes. Their claims tended to 
imply that, despite their small size and ‘non-human’ shape, embryos are owed moral status due 
to other, more intrinsic attributes. For example, in the following op-ed, Angela Shanahan 
suggests that the genetic composition of human embryos was more important than their size 
and cellular organization: 
The biological fact about this cluster of cells is that it is human, with an entire and unique genetic 
code. The embryo may indeed be only a potential person, but it is a unique human being. [Angela 
Shanahan] The Australian 
Shanahan’s statement assumes that moral status is attached to an ‘intrinsic’ biological 
characteristic of the embryo – its ‘human’ genome – and to its potentiality. Implicit in this claim 
is an assumption about the moral relevance of genetics. Such claims humanize embryos by 
personifying them with human genetic characteristics. As noted elsewhere (Lynch, 2009; 
Mulkay, 1997; Parry, 2003; Williams, Kitzinger, & Henderson, 2003), use of these strategies 
attaches different meanings and ontological status to biological objects. Regardless of the 
status that is attributed to living entities, or to particular biological or social characteristics, the 
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use of science to support these claims is informed by norms that vary over time, across cultures 
and within communities (Lynn, 1998). When they come into conflict, norms that are used to 
justify moral arguments are contested, which played out in the Australian debate through the 
attribution of meaning and value to the objects of study in stem cell science. 
The Manifestation of Social Values and Moral Norms 
The norms and ideals of science were a rhetorical resource that participants frequently used 
throughout the Australian debate to support their position. Prominent scientists drew on 
heavily on the rhetoric of science in debating the merits of ESC research. For example, 
opponents such as Professor Emeritus John Martin, who is a distinguished Australian scientist, 
employed the rhetoric of science to dismiss claims that supported the potential utility of SCNT 
as being scientifically unjustifiable, premature or outright fraudulent. To support this position in 
his op-eds, Martin drew on terms like “evidence”, “proof” and “experimental” to argue that 
SCNT research was technically untenable: 
What is the evidence for any of these possibilities? There are no cell-based therapies for any 
disease that would warrant the preparation of human embryonic stem cells by somatic cell 
nuclear transfer. Proof of this as an approach has never been obtained from any experimental 
model of disease in animals. [John Martin] Sydney Morning Herald 
The argument outlined in Martin’s statement asserts that a sufficient amount of evidence 
should exist before this research be allowed to proceed. Underlying this argument is an 
assumption that the burden of proof is high because embryos have the moral status of human 
persons. The argument also conceals assumptions about the moral status of non-human 
animals. In other words, judgments about the adequacy of existing research and the standards 
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of proof required to support further research were made on the basis of pre-formed judgments 
about the ontological status of human embryos, particularly those created using SCNT. 
The use of scientific evidence to assess the potential costs and benefits of research and 
standards of proof requires moral judgments. Participants must form judgments about such 
things as a definition of what constitutes a benefit, the significance of those benefits, and what 
level of harm should be tolerated by whom before scientific research is considered 
un/acceptable (Hempel, 1965; Longino, 1990; Myrdal, 1969; Polanyi, 1962; Rudner, 1953). The 
use of scientific evidence to inform decisions about the meaning of research findings is, 
therefore, culturally-embedded with norms that are relative to the values and commitments of 
those who make these judgments (Laudan, 1984). As participants need to emphasize evidence 
that best supports their arguments, moral judgments must also inform decisions about which 
research findings to highlight, dispute and ignore. 
So far, this study paints a picture of science that is heavily laden with norms and values when 
used in public discourse. The use of science claims in policy contexts is necessarily evaluative 
(Douglas, 2007; Putnam, 2002) because the objects and processes of science cannot be 
separated from the normative framework that supports it (Latour, 1993; Proctor, 1991). The 
genetic properties of embryos and the pluripotent characteristics of stem cells are examples of 
how socially constructed objects are invested with meanings that differ according to the 
context in which they are being used and by whom. Whether these objects are “dangerous”, 
“special”, “tiny”, or some other characteristic, is dependent upon the social actors who invest 
them with meaning and value.  
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In molding the meanings of scientific objects, science thus provided the discursive tools that 
positioned some participants in the Australian debate as righteous and others as immoral. They 
work to impose judgments on the necessity, justification and permissibility of ESC/SCNT 
research as well as on those who might benefit from it. Participants gained the moral ‘high 
ground’ by drawing on a range of theological, philosophical and political resources. Of these 
resources, science claims were prominent because the status of scientific knowledge is 
privileged with authority in public discourse. 
4. Legitimation and the Rhetorical Power of Science 
Science has rhetorical power that, when used effectively, is persuasive and can be mobilized in 
gathering support for a favoured position. Science has this power, in part, because of 
legitimation processes that privilege the moral and epistemic authority of science and scientific 
expertise. Similar to other contexts where participants form alliances with technical experts 
(Banchoff, 2005; Gottweis, 1998; Jasanoff, 2005), science was mobilized as a rhetorical resource 
that many participants in the Australian debate used to establish legitimacy and assert 
authority. 
The Legitimacy of Expertise 
At the commencement of each interview, participants were invited to provide backgrounds on 
themselves and their interests in the debate. In response, participants generally sought to 
present themselves as possessing some form of expertise. Any formal training or qualifications 
they had, especially in science, were emphasized and often in some detail. There was a 
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particular emphasis on the interviewees’ professional background, which often distracted from 
their personal interests and moral concerns.  
The two journalists interviewed in this study, for example, portrayed themselves as reporting 
on an important political or scientific issue, as mandated by their occupation. Both 
acknowledged their personal interests in the issue, but tended to draw more on the 
professional discourses of journalism when discussing their participation in the debate. One 
journalist who was opposed to the policy proposal acknowledged his personal interests as a 
Catholic father of a large family while framing his participation in terms of his extensive 
experience in journalism and as a political editor reporting on stories relevant to Australian 
politics. His “approach” to the debate was described objectively as if detached from it while 
nonetheless clearly stating his moral opposition to ESC research throughout his op-ed 
contributions.  
I've been a political reporter for almost 30 years and when the stem cell debate came up, I 
approached it as a political story. It was the same when the Euthanasia debate came up 10 years 
ago. As a paper we covered it as a political story out of the Northern Territory. Obviously I am a 
Catholic father of nine and we haven't hidden that. Because of that what I write tends to be even 
more closely watched, at which I have no argument with but I have approached the regional stem 
cell debate and the latest one on the basis of a political story [Opponent A] 
Others sought to avoid the moral issues concerning the embryo by focusing on other 
discourses. While this focus may have reflected genuine concerns for other social and moral 
issues, it also functioned as a form of legitimation. Some opponents denied that the moral 
status of embryos was relevant to their position and expressed sensitivity in discussing the 
issue. Opponent B, a practicing Catholic known to have strong moral views, objected to having 
his arguments framed in these terms and insisted that his concerns were strictly scientific:  
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I have personal views which are distinct and they are mine. I’m having these arguments based on 
the science. And I have made the arguments based on the science and I have constantly run up 
against ‘oh you think such and such, we know where you are coming from’, which is pretty 
irritating actually. [Opponent B] 
During this interview, Opponent B maintained that his participation in the debate was purely 
professional.. Although the frustration expressed in above statement suggests that criticisms of 
his professional opinions as being biased by his moral views were taken very personally. Also, 
the emphasis on his role as a scientist suggests that his professional opinions were thought to 
count more than his personal views. Rhetorically separating the personal from the professional 
– the facts from the values – was a discursive resource that many participants used to establish 
their legitimacy as ‘disinterested’ experts. Its utilization suggested that some discourses, along 
with the professional norms, values and interests attached to them, were perceived to have 
greater legitimacy than others in the stem cell debate.  
Policy advocates also drew distinctions between their personal and professional perspectives. 
When doing so, advocates often displaced themselves from the moral issues by reflecting on 
the personal views of opponents as a counterpoint to their own. Framing the issues in this way 
suggested that moral status was as not of primary importance to the policy advocates, but 
rather, one they responded to. Like the opponents interviewed in this study, however, the 
policy advocates made little recognition of the relationship between their moral perspectives of 
the embryo and their professional participation in the debate.  
I am quite happy that some scientists don’t share the same view as me of what the moral status 
of an embryo is. There are some scientists who wouldn’t agree. My personal opinion is that an 
embryo has a potential for life but it can’t have that potential realized until it is placed inside a 
uterus. It just can’t have that potential realized. It’s a special type of human cell but I don’t see it 
as a human…I know a lot about this area and there are a lot of people talking who don’t know a 
lot about the area and I wanted to demystify, and I don’t know if educate is the right word, and 
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certainly not convert, but I wanted to clarify the science in the area and perhaps alleviate the 
concern of some people and hence why I have personally been very interested in participating in 
the debate. [Advocate A] 
Advocate A is a scientist who, like others, expressed her personal interests in mobilizing her 
scientific knowledge and expertise to “inform” others about the science behind the debate. Her 
professional and personal interests in this instance were indistinguishable and clearly 
interrelated. However, participants’ personal and moral views were more often obscured by 
the discourses they used to contest the technical points of stem cell science. The rhetorical 
separation of personal and professional values, therefore, also suggests that while there was a 
perception that scientists may participate in public discourse as technicians, their ability to 
participate directly as individuals complete with personal interests in the moral debate was 
more limited. 
How convincing participants were at maintaining these distinctions depended on how 
persuasive they were at deploying the rhetoric of science. This rhetoric dominates the practice 
of science and normatively reinforces the separation of objective knowledge from the 
subjective beliefs, values and ideals of social actors (Atkinson, 1999; Bazerman, 1997; Gilbert & 
Mulkay, 1984; Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1979). The most successful rhetors in the 
Australian debate were those who deployed this rhetoric so effectively that it seemed like they 
were just ‘stating the facts’ and were not attempting to bias the debate towards their political 
and ideological preferences (Gross, 1990). Given their training in the specialist discourses of 
science, scientists were highly suited to this purpose. 
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Trust, Credibility and the Authority of Scientists 
As indicated in the op-ed analysis, the most prominent discourses in this debate, besides those 
surrounding the embryo, centred on the technical aspects of stem cell science and the 
comparable utility of different stem cell sources. Interviewees were asked to reflect on the 
contested claims about stem cell utility, and while the contestation of science was generally 
considered as unproblematic, there were competing perspectives about what was an 
appropriate use of scientific knowledge in a moral/political debate. Many questions were also 
raised about who had authority to ‘speak for’ science. 
For many of the scientists interviewed, scientific knowledge was an essential prerequisite, as 
was a scientist’s standing within the scientific community and the specificity of their expertise. 
In some instances, the seniority of a scientist could be weighed against the relevance of his or 
her expertise. In others, their expertise could be undermined by their professional status and 
institutional standing (or lack of it). The interviews ultimately revealed highly complex 
hierarchical arrangements between scientists that were often tacit, unclear and contestable:  
I had several chats to XXX and he’s fully entitled to his opinion and fully entitled to speak out on it 
if he strongly believes that, which he does, then you know he has every right to express that. 
What surprized me was that the XXX that I know basically cuts incompetent scientists off at their 
knees and for him to stand side by side with YYY, you know, I felt very disappointed because he is 
an extremely high quality, extremely highly respected scientist who has made very very important 
contributions to the area. Standing side by side with somebody who has really only, as ZZZ put it, 
you know, he’s a junior low achiever. [Advocate B] 
In this statement, Advocate B expressed respect for and acknowledged the authority of a senior 
colleague while simultaneously expressing a sense of betrayal for supporting another, more 
junior (and hence less credible) scientist who opposed the policy proposal. Scientists who 
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opposed ESC/SCNT research were criticized (by policy advocates) for their real and perceived 
religious commitments – a consideration which rarely factored as relevant for policy advocates, 
even where they had openly acknowledged their religious views. These commitments were 
often targeted in discrediting the opponents’ technical claims, particularly where a scientists’ 
professional reputation was beyond reproach:  
I do not know of any scientists who are claiming that there will be no benefits from embryonic 
stem cell research apart from scientists who are totally religiously committed as their primary 
points of view. So to quote XXX who is a personal friend and a person who I respect as a scientist 
and ignore the fact that XXX has been for the whole of his life a totally dedicated and committed 
Roman Catholic who accepts the view of the Church on this subject is silly. Because XXX will 
himself agree that his views are primarily based on his religious faith rather than on his science. 
This is absolutely fine. You know and I don’t have a problem with him having views like that. I do 
have a problem if he says ‘I am taking this view as a scientist’. [Advocate B] 
Again, in this statement Advocate B expresses respect for colleague XXX while objecting to a 
scientist contesting the claimed consensus of the scientific establishment on personal bases. At 
first, these dual discourses appear to conflict but nevertheless  do work in discursively 
undermining the credibility of an opponent’s counterclaims while maintaining hierarchical 
relationships within a discourse community. On the other hand, opponents of ESC/SCNT 
research used slightly different strategies in discursively diminishing the credibility or authority 
of prominent scientists supporting liberal policies: 
Well you know that Australian Academic of Science and the Chief Scientist were asked to go and 
talk to parliament. Well what AAA would know about this simply eludes me totally. AAA is a 
botanist and biochemist, and a very distinguished one, but really knows nothing about this… 
There are very, very few people who are informed about this topic and BBB keeps getting up and 
presenting himself as the representative of the Australian Academy of Science and talking about 
this and I had to email him about this yesterday saying, ‘well look, nobody has asked me’. I’m a 
Fellow of the Australian Academy of Science. There’s been no consultation with the Academy of 
Science and there aren’t many people in the Academy of Science who are really in any position to 
make any informed comment on this at all. And yet he is getting up there and speaking as if he 
was the representative. So who speaks? [Opponent B] 
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In this statement, Opponent B dismisses the expertise of Australia’s Chief Scientist as being 
largely irrelevant and claims that stem cell scientists at the Australian Academy of Science failed 
to consult with the broader membership in publicly supporting the policy proposal. As such, it 
was implied that ESC supporters at the Academy could not claim authority to speak on behalf of 
the scientific community, alluding to an assumption that institutional decisions within science 
are, or least ought to be, consultative and democratic. While Opponent B clearly appears to 
have been frustrated by the representations of senior scientists supporting the policy proposal, 
his expressed concerns about the process of political representativeness may be seen as a 
strategic attempt to discursively delegitimize the delegated authority of appointed 
officeholders. Another strategy was to highlight possible economic interests of scientists 
supporting the policy proposal: 
The lobbyists employed by the Australian Stem Cell Centre, the scientists not employed by the 
Australian Stem Cell Centre, eminent scientists who weighed in with a view that is not based in 
science so much as being based on a view about science in general. That is, the subtext for a lot of 
it seems to be that if the government wants to legislate about us doing science in this area that 
they will control and legislate about science in all areas. So it seems like its fear driven [Opponent 
C] 
Scientists were framed in this statement by Opponent C as agenda-driven “lobbyists” who may 
not only have vested interests in pursuing more liberal legislation but may also hold fears of 
losing their autonomy if science is overly regulated. Such interests represent flaws in the 
character of ‘good’ scientists and thus might imply potential biases in their scientific judgments. 
This strategy may have been aimed at countering the criticisms targeted towards the perceived 
personal biases of opponents holding religious views. In this sense, scientists on both ‘sides’ 
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were calling into question the disinterestedness and impartiality of others using similar 
rhetorical tools that appealed to the character or ethos of scientists (Prelli, 1997).  
Scientists are generally privileged with expert authority in policy contexts on the basis of their 
assumed impartiality and disinterestedness (Merton, 1942/1973). Suggesting that scientists 
have some sort of conflicting interest in a policy issue calls their credibility into question 
because it runs counter to the rhetorical norms of value-neutrality (Mitroff, 1974). Their 
credibility may easily be undermined because the source of bias can be situated with any social 
value – financial, ideological, political or personal. As the effective use of science claims is 
contingent upon one’s trust in the character and credibility of those who use them (Carey, 
1996), they work to contest the moral and epistemic authority of scientists. 
Contested Moral and Epistemic Authority 
Moral and epistemic authority was contested on three levels during the Australian debate. First 
was at the individual level, where participants entered public debate to speak about the moral 
and technical issues either for themselves or the institutions they claimed to represent. The 
second was at the macro-level of the social institution, where organizational ‘actors’ such as the 
ASCC and Anglican Church, entered the debate to speak for, or on behalf of, the institutional 
norms, values and ideals they ascribe to. The third was at the meta-level of epistemology where 
participants appealed to the epistemic and moral authority of science and religion.  
Participants from across the debate drew on multiple epistemic and moral resources, often in 
heterogeneous ways. Some policy advocates drew on their religious beliefs in portraying the 
embryo as morally irrelevant, while some opponents drew on secular arguments in conferring 
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embryos with moral significance. Consistently, however, all drew on scientific resources to 
substantiate their moral arguments:  
Those people see themselves as protecting human life but the question is ‘when does human life 
begin’ and for them, human life begins at conception. Now of course this view became powerfully 
underlined in the 19th century within the Roman Catholic Church with the development of 
embryology and being able to see the embryo under a microscope. But to my mind, while 
certainly a form of something living, it is not a human life. Embryonic life or what people now 
refer to as pre-embryonic life, whether that is accurate I don’t know, but it’s not a human foetus 
that’s for sure. The apparatus for the human foetus begins at this 14 day stage with the 
development of the primitive streak. [Advocate E] 
As an authoritative figure within the Anglican Church, Advocate E expressed an alternative view 
to the “Christian view” that is commonly presented in public discourse. Intertwined within this 
view were discourses drawn from multiple epistemic and moral resources, including both the 
advocate’s knowledge of embryology and its historical influences on Roman Catholic doctrine. 
In doing so, the Church’s authority was challenged by framing its position as a socially and 
historically constructed ‘truth’ and, as such, was open both to contest and change. Religious 
values, or lack thereof, thus did not appear as a determinant of participants’ support or 
opposition to ESC research, which was likely to have been contingent upon more complex 
understandings of the epistemic, moral and social discourses in play and the participant’s ability 
to shape them. 
Most interviewees generally agreed that no one individual or institution could rightly claim 
moral authority in this debate. Some, however, felt that while science played an important 
technical role, it was inherently unable to address the moral issues that arose in the stem cell 
debate. Another authoritative figure within the Catholic Church who opposed ESC research 
suggested that while scientists should contribute to debate concerning the moral dimensions of 
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their work, their authority in areas of moral philosophy was weakened by nature of scientific 
inquiry: 
Science will tell us at what stage a developing embryo or foetus or newborn child demonstrates 
capacities like perception sensation language some kind of rational thought. Those are questions 
that science can provide some information on. But it can’t tell us what is the marker that really 
matters - that it’s rationality that matters or sensation is what matters or just being a human 
organism is what matters. Those are essentially philosophical questions… There is only so much 
we can ask scientists to do. We can’t expect them to do the philosophical or theological thinking. 
That said, one would hope and one should respect that scientists themselves always have a 
perspective and they come with a philosophy and theology of their own. Very often, even if there 
are differences between them and there is no single neutral perspective here that is somehow 
outside of human observation and experience, everyone brings their baggage with them to these 
issues and interprets the science they see with a certain mindset, which may evolve and change 
and be challenged and be radically undermined or converted in one way or another as time goes 
on. [Opponent D] 
In this quote, science is portrayed as a source of descriptive knowledge with limited capacity to 
evaluate issues of moral significance. Opponent D asserts the authority of moral theology by 
portraying science as a social system with a specific epistemology that is (“one would hope”) 
governed by its own values, beliefs and ideals which are open to change and contestation. Its 
neutrality is questioned and malleability of its terms and meanings is implied. Thus, science is 
not merely put on an equal footing with theology; it is rendered as entirely inadequate in 
addressing moral philosophical questions – a responsibility to be shared amongst other ways of 
knowing that may be better suited to this purpose.  
Science and religion are both immensely powerful institutions with purportedly coherent sets 
of norms, values and ideals (Turner, 1997) that are reflected in the discursive strategies 
adopted by those who claim to represent or speak on their behalf. However, these values and 
ideals are not discrete and individuals may identify with the values of both at any one time and 
incorporate them into the language they use in public discourse (Weasel & Jensen, 2005). As 
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such, participants may draw upon a range of epistemic and ontological resources in formulating 
their perspectives, even if these conflict with the prevailing norms of a particular institution 
(Jasanoff, 2004). Hence, while there may be a rich heterogeneity in the discourses used by the 
individuals who actually engage in the stem cell debates, both in Australia and elsewhere, there 
will also be homogeneity at the institutional level where science policy issues are ultimately 
contested. 
5. Conclusions 
This study examined the mobilization of science and scientific knowledge in public debates 
surrounding ESC research in Australia. The purpose of this study was to examine the space that 
science occupies in public contests over facts, values and ‘evidence’ and disagreements over 
who has legitimacy and authority to determine how major science policy issues are resolved. 
From this study, it is clear that science manifests as a discursive tool that provides participants 
with powerful political, moral and rhetorical resources. As discursive tools, science claims 
contain moral dimensions that are informed by the norms, values and ideals that shape the 
meaning of key terms and concepts that are used in debate. Science claims are political in that 
they provide participants with a source of legitimation to negotiate meaning, and are rhetorical 
in that, when used effectively, they are also persuasive.  
In the public debate surrounding the Australian stem cell policy episode in 2005-6, science 
claims were a rhetorical means of achieving a desired moral outcome. Science claims allowed 
those opposed to the liberalization of Australia’s stem cell policy to state their opposition in 
terms of the immorality of creating and destroying human embryos for research purposes. In 
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contrast, they allowed the policy advocates to position their arguments within the ethical 
framework of medicine and the moral good of pursuing outcomes associated with medical 
benefit. Science was mobilized as a reliable, valid and neutral source of knowledge, giving it a 
moral authority that worked to invest each position with truth and integrity. Through it, 
participants were able to draw on the authority of science to frame their arguments in ways 
that seemed more than simply a particular personal or religious perspective. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, each ‘side’ accused the other of misconstruing scientific evidence and corrupting the 
truth with vested interests, political ideals and social values. Attacks upon the experts ‘acting’ 
for each side thereby challenged the legitimacy of their ‘scientific’ authority and, by association, 
their moral authority.  
The role of science in this policy episode, therefore, was not necessarily to inform, or even to 
persuade, but to win. This eristic use of scientific rhetoric raises questions about whether this is 
the role science ought to play in public discourse. Science plays an important rhetorical role as a 
means of exploring possible meanings and solutions to policy problems as well as helping to 
clarify and deepen public understandings of the issues at hand. However, the authority of 
science is misused when it utilized as means of silencing others and winning at all costs.  
Such misuse is perhaps an inevitable outcome of policymaking processes that are set up within 
a win/lose framework, where interested parties can only either support or oppose a policy 
proposal. Disguising arguments that may actually be jurisdictional as questions over definition, 
quality and characteristics might also suit certain actors. Thus, moving away from this culture of 
argumentation might not serve the interests of those who have power to change it. However, 
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such frameworks are inherently inequitable and, in the long term, have the potential to greatly 
damage public trust in science. Alternative frameworks might consist of more deliberative 
forums where a much broader range of voices are included in the decision-making process. 
While such frameworks will undoubtedly also have their limitations, greater deliberation may 
widen the possible positions and outcomes that are available in resolving science policy issues 
and ultimately encourage a more open and enriched public debate. 
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i The one recommendation rejected by the Parliament related to the creation of ‘human-animal’ (admixed) embryos. 
ii See online supplementary material for methods 
iii Participants were categorised as either ‘advocating’ or ‘opposing’ the policy proposal to liberalize the existing 
legislation governing stem cell research in Australia. 
iv Op-ed quotes are transcribed verbatim and authors attributed respectively. However, interview texts have been de-
identified and edited according to standards for using verbatim quotations in reporting qualitative research (Corden 
and Sainbury 2006). Some interview texts have also been censored where interviewees have made potentially 
defamatory comments about other participants. 
v Four of these items were written by political analysts making broader commentary on Australian party politics 
without  stating a position on the whether the legislation ought to be liberalized. The position in the other item was 
ambiguous due to the degree of sarcasm and false analogies employed by the author (between Saddam Hussein, 
capital punishment and human embryos). 
                                                 
